Wednesday, March 2, 2011

Day 3 of the Second PrepCom - Cooperation and Assistance

(c) Jesper Waldersten
Overview of the day's discussions

Many delegations stressed the critical role that international cooperation and assistance would play in the implementation of the future treaty. There was a surprisingly high level of support for the establishment of a secretariat, perhaps located within the UN, to facilitate treaty implementation. In contrast, relatively few delegations supported the inclusion of a provision on victim assistance in the treaty.

A wide-ranging discussion in the afternoon raised a number of points on different aspects of the treaty. The Chair announced that a new Chair's non-paper would be issued on Day 4 of this PrepCom.

Delegations' statements

Australia strongly supports the humanitarian objective of ATT of reducing armed conflict and violence. Cooperation and assistance (C&A) is a key element in the treaty, in accordance with the Paris and Accra Declarations on Aid Effectiveness. Will provide amended language to the Chair (e.g. in certain cases, changing "shall" to "may" or "accepts to"). It called for a gender perspective to C&A. It supports an amended victim assistance provision, which focuses on national planning and service delivery.

Antigua and Barbuda (on behalf of CARICOM) stated that C&A is an integral part of the treaty: financial, technical and legal assistance and sharing of best practice. ATT implementation will require training of personnel and acquisition of sophisticated equipment. Also need assistance in the legal aspects of the treaty and its domestic implementation.

Hungary (on behalf of the EU) said that the EU takes C&A very seriously, and has already been supporting such efforts (e.g. through UNIDIR project). ATT should include C&A measures in it. Supports "gist" of Chair's proposals. All C&A activities should be provided on a voluntary basis. If a UN structure is set up under the treaty, this entity could facilitate C&A. On victim assistance, EU feels that it is not appropriate to include specific provisions on this issue in the treaty.

Papua New Guinea (on behalf of the 11 Pacific Island States) stated that States "in a position to do so" could assist the Pacific Island States in implementing the treaty, especially in domestic enforcement of the treaty's provisions. It encouraged best practice to be followed in determining treaty reporting obligations.

Algeria stated that it endorsed the majority of the Chair's provisions. It also wanted to see national capacity building to ensure effective treaty implementation. It felt that victim assistance provisions should be deleted as this fell under national obligations.

Egypt stated it was not clear whether C&A was focusing just on implementation or also on advocacy for adherence. It was complicated to discuss these issues without agreeing on the objectives of the treaty. It wanted, though, stronger language, requiring the provision of assistance and to see the treaty focus on treaty members. It felt that straying into "gender discussions" was "extremely unhelpful". On victim assistance, it wanted to see some measure of responsibility for those providing arms that were then used for abuse.

USA stated that the ATT is a treaty to regulate the legitimate trade in arms, not an arms control agreement. Implementing it will require a robust national review of proposed transfers. This is expensive and requires considerable effort. Therefore, C&A will be needed for certain States. Also support a "clearing house" for requests. Do not support language giving a "right" to receive assistance as it might imply a corresponding duty to provide it. The concept of victim assistance "has no place in this treaty" and recommend deletion.

Norway welcomed the Chair's proposals. It stated that this is not an ordinary trade agreement because of the nature of arms. A humanitarian approach was needed for a treaty whose aim is to prevent the illicit or irresponsible trade in arms that results in armed violence and human suffering.  Norway is convinced that the treaty should include VA provisions, although it was not suggesting that new obligations should be created. The value of the ATT would be ultimately to reduce armed violence and human suffering. Norway supported Australian call for gender perspective to C&A.

Trinidad and Tobago stated that it was imperative that consultation took place between States Parties to facilitate implementation combined with a comprehensive framework for C&A. Called for dedicated secretariat to support treaty implementation.

Japan said that effective national import and export mechanisms was critical to ATT implementation, and therefore certain States would need C&A to meet their obligations. Most important part of C&A was national capacity building for national control systems and enforcement agencies. Not convinced that VA should be in the treaty.

Singapore stated that technical assistance should be provided by States in a position to do so and on a voluntary basis.

Switzerland stated that there was some overlap and ambiguity in the Chair's draft. It proposed specific language on C&A.

UK stated that C&A was essential for treaty implementation. It also felt there was overlap between several paragraphs and suggested text to merge paragraphs 2 to 4 of the Chair's draft. Supported  Australia's view that assistance should take account of the impact of armed violence on women.

India stated that broader provisions should be included on C&A. It did not believe that VA provisions were appropriate to the treaty.

Indonesia stated that comprehensive C&A provisions were needed in the treaty. It also felt that insufficient time was allocated to discussion of these issues in the PrepCom.

Iran stated that C&A can play a decisive role in encouraging treaty adherence and implementation, especially among developing States. Support establishment of a "committee" to facilitate treaty implementation.

The Netherlands stated that many C&A activities have already been undertaken in analogous fields.

France stated that Chair's proposals were an excellent basis for discussion. It wanted to see more included on efforts to combat the illicit trade in arms. This required penal cooperation at domestic level. On VA, France felt it was not appropriate to include such provisions in a treaty regulating the trade in arms.

China stated its support for C&A provisions in the treaty. International C&A should be provided on a voluntary basis and should not be imposed on recipient countries.

Israel stated that C&A should be provided on a voluntary basis. Assistance should focus on capacity building for legal and control frameworks. VA should not be included in the treaty.

Nigeria stated its support for the Chair's proposals and endorsed Norway's views on the provisions. It wanted to see VA provisions in the treaty.

Tanzania stated that C&A would give the ATT a positive human face. Wanted the word "shall" to remain in the draft.

Brazil stressed the capacity-building aspect of industrial cooperation.

The Philippines stated its support for the Chair's proposals.

New Zealand supported a greater emphasis on capacity building and mutual legal support. Also supported a secretariat to facilitate treaty implementation. Supported Papua New Guinea's views on treaty reporting.

Argentina stated that VA should not be included in the ATT.

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The day continued with informal consultations on the treaty.

Japan (on transaction activities) suggested for practical reasons to focus on the regulation of physical movement of arms, instead of controlling titles. They also supported the UK's proposed amendments to the introductory sentence (chapeau) for the criteria, calling for the replacement of the text with “State shall apply the following criteria.”

Malaysia prefers the language of the UN register. On parameters: risk transfer analysis can be highly political, and suggested that Article II be redrafted.

Canada referred to the common international standard, which would serve as a floor and not a ceiling, but which should not mean a low standard (“upper level loft”). On dual-use technology, there was a need for clarification in order to avoid impediments to economic developments as an unintended consequence.

Burundi (on behalf on the Community of East African States) strongly support the inclusion of SALW; and C&A.

Spain stated that there should not be distinction between munition and ammunition. The scope must be broad, but there is no need to have a section on exceptions. In relation to violence against women, Spain stated that such an issue is consistent with the mandate to negotiate an ATT; reference was made to the UNSC 1325 (2000), on Women.

The Netherlands stated the need to expand the criteria of the UN register. Technical assistance and technology transfer need to be covered; this would foster cooperation of defence industries. In Annex A, they suggested to add troop transport on military aircraft.

Nigeria (on behalf of ECOWAS) stressed the need to include explosives, munitions/ammunitions and SALW. On criteria - Article I - they suggest to replace the word “should” with “shall”. On Article I A.2, they suggest to replace the word “should” with “shall”. They strongly support the provision on sustainable development (I B.3).

Zambia supports a strong provision on C&A.

The Chair acknowledged the difficulties for the delegations to work in abstract, which does not conduce to a full understanding of the topic. He stressed the importance of the interrelationship of the different elements of an ATT, which are intrinsically linked with the implementation and the applicability of many concepts exchanged. He then announced the production of a new paper for Thursday, which is meant to be thought-provoking. The structure of the paper will take the following form:
1) Scheme (a model identifying the elements)
2) Principles
3) Objectives
4) Scope
5) Criteria
6) International cooperation and assistance

Tuesday, March 1, 2011

Day 2 of the Second PrepCom - Criteria/Parameters

Overview of the day's discussions

On Day Two very broad differences were evident between the majority of delegations and a significant minority during the discussion on criteria/parameters (i.e. the basis on which a State must or should deny a request for an arms transfer from another State). 

(c) Jesper Waldersten
Many delegations supported Ambassador Moritan's paper as a basis for discussion. Several States (e.g. Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Senegal, Switzerland, UK) as well as the ICRC did, though, point out the potentially fatal drafting flaws in the chapeau paragraph that introduced the various criteria in his "non-paper". They called for the deletion or strengthening of the offending text, which called only on States to "take into consideration, as appropriate" the criteria set out in the rest of the proposal. This could imply that the criteria were not legally binding. (For an analysis of the Chair's draft on Criteria/Parameters, see the following post on this blog: Informal Draft Paper on Criteria/Parameters by the Chair of the Preparatory Committee for an ATT.)

In contrast, Cuba, Egypt, Pakistan and the Russian Federation sought deletion of criteria relating to international human rights and humanitarian law, to development, and to corruption on the basis that such criteria are subjective. These States clearly remain to be persuaded of the merits of an ATT.

Many States called for a prohibition on transfers to non-State armed groups (NSAGs), including Brazil, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, India, Iran, and the Russian Federation.

Delegations' statements

Iran stressed the need for a realistic approach to the ATT. It was only in favour of the inclusion of the 7 categories under the UN register. It further called for missiles not to be covered by the ATT while proposing adding a new category of electromagnetic weapons (some of these weapons can be used to destroy incoming missiles). 

Hungary (on behalf of the EU) noted that the introductory paragraph needed stronger language. It supported many of the criteria included in the Chair's paper, notably compliance with UNSC decisions on arms embargoes/IHL, and International Human Rights Law, intra-State conflict, and the risk of corruption. It stated that lack of compliance with any criteria should result in the automatic denial of the proposed transfer.

Bangladesh claimed that Article 51 of the UN Charter provided a legal basis for a right to the acquisition of arms. However, it also called for a broad range of transactions and weapons to be covered by the treaty, and noted that capacity-building needs, cross-border monitoring and treaty implementation all needed to be included in the treaty. It called for a prohibition on handing over weapons to non-State armed groups (NSAGs).

Brazil also called for no "unauthorised" internal transfers to NSAGs. It also called for strengthening of the criteria, claiming that the proposals on development and corruption were too vague.

Liechtenstein supported the inclusive approach adopted by the Chair, while noting that no single delegation had a right to a veto.

Burkina Faso stated that any proposed transfers that fell foul of the criteria should be denied.

UK stated that the eight criteria as a basis for the risk assessment are a good basis for discussion. They proposed amendments to the introductory sentence for the criteria, calling for the replacement of the text with “State shall apply the following criteria”.

Ecuador also suggested that the criteria should include the violation of territorial integrity. It was concerned that certain criteria were too subjective, especially those relating to development, which it thought should be deleted.

China stated that the criteria used must be objective, pragmatic, balanced, and practical, and claimed that the criteria of transfer fell within the prerogative of States. On the issue of human rights and IHL, China stated that different States had adhered to different treaties. [Bloggers note: This is of course true, but customary IHL and IHRL, such as the right to life and to freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment apply to all States, irrespective of their treaty obligations.] On the proposed criteria of development and corruption, China felt that these criteria should be deleted. Finally, it called for a prohibition on export to NSAGs.

Côte d'Ivoire made a long statement, accusing at least two States of supplying weapons in violation of an arms embargo. It warned of the problems of transfers to NSAGs. 

Norway supported the UK's statement on the chapeau paragraph. It stated that the ATT would be a complex instrument. 

Switzerland called for the deletion of the second sentence of the chapeau paragraph. Switzerland suggested that the criterion on corruption might be redrafted in a way to actually linking the issue to the transfer of arms.

Sweden made an interesting intervention on the possible obligations under the treaty for States importing weapons or through which weapons transited, suggesting that different criteria would be needed.

Singapore stated that universality would be needed for an effective ATT. It said that the standards laid down should be comprehensive, objective, and should command consensus.

Egypt said that the ATT should apply to all States, not just those exporting. It felt that many of the criteria proposed were subjective and should be deleted, notably the references to IHL and IHRL, development, corruption, and organised crime. It even suggested a new provision whereby when a State met the remaining criteria, there should be an obligation to transfer "on favourable conditions", and "without delay".

The Netherlands supported other delegations calling for the chapeau to be strengthened. It stated that in no way should an ATT be considered to lead to an obligation to supply.

Russia called for the treaty not to be "politicised". It must be universal, and with clear wording, and the provisions must be practically implementable. It called for only criteria that can be interpreted objectively to be included.

Canada supported other delegations calling for the chapeau to be strengthened. It stated that although Canada believed in equality, "not all criteria are created equal". It suggested that certain criteria could be more hortatory (e.g. relating to development and corruption).

Mexico stated that the ATT should not be limited to exporter's obligations. It should provide for a dialogue between exporting and importing States. It called for criteria relating to IHL and IHRL to be dealt with separately.

Nigeria (on behalf of the African group) stated that the UN Register is not comprehensive enough for the ATT. It supported the 7+1+1 approach. Among the important issues to be covered by a future treaty, were victim assistance, respect for IHL and IHRL and the impact of the arms trade on the socio-economic situation of the recipient country. Nigeria also insisted that the ECOWAS convention was a good model for the ATT.

Austria stressed the need to deal with corruption within the framework of the ATT to ensure an effective control of the arms trade.

Cuba stressed that the parameters for the future treaty must respect the right to self-defence, be non-discriminatory and objective. It believed that the references to arms embargoes was redundant since they are already obligations upon States. Cuba did not want any references to IHL, IHRL, or development as criteria. Cuba also believes that corruption is too vague as a parameter.

Liberia referred to States in Africa using arms to oppress their own people.

Spain does not support the proposed deletion of criteria relating to IHL, IHRL, or development. It also supported the deletion of “as appropriate” in the chapeau.

Thailand stated that human rights can be highly politicized unless there is a clear link between human rights and a proposed arms transfer.

Burundi supports the inclusion of SALW in the scope of the treaty. 

Finland stated that the criteria proposed are similar to those used in their national practice. The following criteria merit highlighting: compliance with the State's international obligations in assessing transfers; compliance with IHL and IHRL; and risk of diversion. It welcomed the criterion dealing with corruption.

USA stated that the ATT should be considered as a floor and not a ceiling. Additional factors can be taken into account based on the state decision-making. The list of criteria/parameters is partly dependent on scope and national implementation. The chapeau of the paper should be modified. The US delegation was not supportive of language on development and corruption. Section II on sources of information to assess situations before transfers, should be deleted.

India stated that the parameters should be objective, non-discriminatory, and predictable. Transfers to NSAGs should be prohibited. Criteria on development should be based on assessment made by UN bodies and be made objective and predictable. 

Uruguay referred to the value of looking at, for example, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, which is a binding instrument addressing the transport of certain hazardous material.

Algeria stated it endorsed all human rights instruments but does not adopt the approach of regulating the trade of arms though IHRL.

Pakistan are of the opinion that the objectives of the ATT must be settled before working on the criteria. In any case, they want a treaty which is based on objective parameters.

Russia reminds that vague criteria cannot be truly effective. There should be measures to ensure that the flow of arms that goes to illegal armed groups and organized crimes committing  violations of human rights, be controlled and national control systems to regulate arms flow must then be strengthened. In Russia, for example, any illegal arms activity are severely punished by national criminal law.

France noted that states seem to have two visions of the goals of an ATT. For certain states, the ATT should focus on the regulation of the illicit trade, for others, the ATT should deal with the issue of the international trade of weapons in a broad way. France wants a treaty that seeks to regulate legal as well as illegal trade. With regards to the text distributed by the Chair, this would not be the case now. For example, looking at the corruption provision, it can be thought either as a parameter for trade (assess the substantial risk of corruption before transfer), or it could be considered as a crime that should be dealt with along the lines of the relevant treaties on the issue.

Senegal called for the chapeau language to be strengthened.

Syria stated that an ATT should be based on the principles set out in the UN Charter. It should be free from politicisation and double standards, and therefore be non-discriminatory. Syria wanted to remove reference to human rights and IHL.

Iran made similar suggestions to Syria and called for a prohibition on arms transfers to terrorist groups.

ICRC called for the chapeau language to be strengthened and noted that it has published a guide on applying IHL criteria to a proposed arms transfer.

Day 1 of the Second PrepCom - Scope

Overview of the day's discussions

The first day of the Second Prepcom was devoted to discussion on the scope of the future treaty based on the Chair's proposals, which is not intended as legal drafting or actual treaty provisions.

The detailed discussion demonstrates that most governments wish to move swiftly beyond general statements in the preparatory work on the treaty. Only the Russian Federation  and Pakistan seemed to question whether an ATT was needed, although many delegations stressed that consensus has to be the basis for agreement.

Many countries (in particular from the Arab Group, but also China and Iran) reaffirmed the principles of the UN Charter as a background for the ATT (right to self-defense, the principle of non-intervention, territorial integrity, self-determination).

An overwhelming number of countries were in favor of the so-called 7+1+1 coverage (i.e. the seven categories of conventional weapons on the UN Arms Register plus small arms and light weapons (SALW) plus ammunition). Some countries still oppose this, notably Egypt, while China stated that it was already covered in other fora such as the platform of action within the UN or the UN Firearms Protocol. The issue of ammunition provoked considerable discussion, with a few States claiming that the quantities of ammunition would make it difficult to include in the treaty. A good number of delegations were also in favor of the inclusion of the parts and components in the ATT to avoid the risk of its provisions being easily circumvented.

Many delegations noted that the definitions and wording of the list of weapons that should be covered differed from the language used in the UN Register. As the Register was agreed language, some delegations (China, for example) stressed that it should be the one used to avoid further conflicts.

Different wording was in particular chosen for the definition of the weapons in the Annex A. Some delegations stressed that in some cases, the ‘new’ definitions of weapons as proposed in the annex could even mean other weapon than those listed in the core text.

There was also brief discussion of the legal status of annexes in treaty law. Many delegations believe that annexes give greater flexibility than would the inclusion of weapons and their definitions in the body of the treaty to update the treaty. Further research on the legal status of annexes in treaty law is therefore needed.

Another interesting debate concerned the "calibre" of weapons, as some delegations noted that the specification of a specific calibre for weapons (regarding tanks, for example) could unduly limit the scope of the treaty.

There was also discussion on the structuring of the text on weapons to be covered by the treaty. One delegation proposed that the ATT should stick to a strict "positive" listing, i.e. listing those weapons that should be covered and not listing those excluded. Others preferred an "it's all in unless it's excluded" approach. With regard to the exceptions, some countries noted that the issue of national transfer and domestic ownership should be mentioned in the preamble and not be included a exclusion in a specific provision.

Two other proposed exceptions (sporting/hunting rifles and antique weapons) also led to debate. Mexico emphasised that sporting rifles imported from abroad were extensively used by criminal gangs in their country and in others after having been technically modified. On antique weapons, issues of definition were raised. One delegation (Iraq) recalled that in the Firearms Protocol a weapon was considered antique if manufactured before 1927.

On the list of activities, many delegations noted that the list could be simplified. The definition of brokering should also be simplified. Many delegations were not in favor of including technical assistance, R&D, and financing in the scope of activities covered by the treaty. For many developing countries, including those activities might mean that obstacles were being placed on development.

The need to include military explosives was cited by Norway, among others, and several interventions referred to  the issue of "post-transfer" (follow up of exports, tracing of exports). Finally, several delegations stated that the transfer of arms for their own military troops abroad should not be covered by an ATT.

Delegations' statements

Costa Rica made a general statement about the objectives of an ATT and its fundamental elements, reaffirming States' responsibilities under the UN Charter and the substantial risk that arms may used be commit or to facilitate violations of international human rights law, international humanitarian law or other international obligations. The minimum requirement to eliminate the gaps in international law. Costa Rica supports the 7 + 1 + 1 formula.

CARICOM stated that the 7+1+ 1 formula is the only way for a comprehensive ATT. Reference was made to data and figures relating to the Geneva Declaration on armed violence and development.

Bahrein (on behalf of the Arab Group) called for the treaty not to politicize human rights through interference with the internal affairs of States.

Hungary on behalf of the EU stated that an ATT could also include in its scope military explosives, specifically designed or modified for military purposes, provided that they are clearly defined. Parts and components, specially designed or modified for military use, of all items included in the scope of an ATT should also be covered. It proposed to redraft para II (l), so that the notion of "parts and components" applies to all categories of the scope of an ATT, including category on technology and equipment. This category could include electronics, computers, telecommunications, information security, sensors and lasers, transportation and training devices that are specially designed or modified for military use.

The EU also stated that definition of brokering should be simplified. Finally, R&D and financing should not be included in the scope. The EU is not convinced about the appropriateness of having a specific section devoted to exclusions. Any item or activity not explicitly mentioned in the positive definition of scope should not be covered by the treaty.

Egypt preferred to limit the scope to the seven categories, since SALW are covered in the UN programme of action. Concerning munition/ammunition, Egypt claimed that there was no consensus on their definitions. Egypt did not wish to see "parts and equipments" fall within the mandate of the negotiations (reference was made to dual-use parts, and the impact of their control for civilian industries).

UK stated that since time is pressing and the issues are complex, there is a need to go beyond general statements, because "the negotiation has started". Since the first PrepCom (July 2010), the world is facing continuing new security challenges (economic, piracy, insurgency) and States have responsibilities to take collective action. It claimed that an "ATT can increase confidence in today uncertain world".

India stated that the issues of scope, parameters and implementation are linked and mutually interdependent and need to be evaluated together. India was concerned that the list of conventional weapons in Annex A (a. to g.) does not reflect the one in the UN register. Such a proposed list needs further technical expertise. India proposed a more pragmatic approach, which would be to use the language used in the UN register. Technical assistance and technology, which are hard to define, should not be include in the scope of an ATT and may lead to discriminatory practices.

Indonesia stated that with regard to the parameters of the ATT, embargoes by regional organizations should not apply to other States. It referred to the principle of territorial integrity and the right of States to acquire conventional arms. The draft should endeavour to cover protection of democratic States against separatist movements. Indonesia supports the 7 + 1 + 1 formula.

Tanzania stated the importance of international and cooperation to victims.

Norway declared that the goal of an ATT is humanitarian, and should therefore include all categories of arms and weapons.

Japan declared that the wording "shall include" does not preclude States from adding other categories. It supports the 7 + 1 + 1 formula.

Cuba stated that an ATT must be aimed at preventing the illicit trafficking and should not be discriminatory and selective. It referred to the UN Charter principles (non-interference in domestic affairs, sovereignty, territorial integrity and legitimate self-defense).

Brazil supports the 7+1+1 formula. It is against the inclusion of certain type of transfer involving technical assistance, R&D, and financing.

Argentina declared that the treaty must be non-discriminatory in nature and be based on consensus.

China stated that the ATT is intended to regulate actions in arms trade, prevent and combat unregulated arms trade. It is not a treaty for arms control. The ATT should only address the problems in arms trade and not include issues related to human development or human rights. It should not hamper the legitimate defense needs of the State nor affect security and sovereignty of States.

On scope, it noted that the seven categories of weapons in the draft paper are not consistent with the UN register list, therefore any extension or amendment of the 7 categories should be conducted with extreme caution. As to the inclusion of SALW, China stated that this is already covered in other fora, notably the UN Programme of Action or the UN Firearms Protocol.

Pakistan called the ATT process "a time-bomb process". It declared that the current discussion gives the impression that we are in an advanced stage of negotiations and it underlined the importance of the principles and objectives of an ATT. Focusing on transfers alone is not sustainable, there is a need to look at the symptomatic side of the purported problem: there is nothing about production and development of arms. As to the criteria of human rights issues and development, Pakistan is concerned that the outcome will not command consensus.

New Zealand stressed the importance of looking at the post-transfer process (i.e., marking, and tracing/tracability).

Russia stated that the goals of the ATT process needed to be more clearly settled in order to enable a discussion on other aspects, including scope and parameters. It thus proposed to define the goals of the documents, which must reach two requirements:
1) It should be clear and agreed by all States and focus on the greatest threat: conventional weapons
2) It should include concrete workable goals to achieve consensus.

It then stressed the important goal of preventing weapons falling within illegal channels.

Switzerland supports the 7 + 1 + 1 approach + also parts and components and military explosives. The section on brokering should be simplified.

Sweden stressed the need to include "parts and components". It gave two reasons: if they are not covered, it can enable controls to be circumvented; and because parts and components can enable the life of weapons to be prolonged and new capabilities to be incorporated. An ATT can increase confidence in export control capability and pave the way for technology transfer. It supports the positive list approach: anything that is not mentioned is not controlled, and recommended not to use a negative list (setting out exceptions to general rule), unless it is comprehensive.

Mexico stated that it is not advisable to include a section on exceptions. The representative raised the serious issue of sport and hunting weapons. They are becoming more and more similar to military weapons, easy adaptable and modified for other purposes, such as terrorism and transnational international crimes. 

Uruguay stressed the need to have a broad approach such as the UN Security Council arms embargoes, which go far beyond the 7+1+1 formula, e.g. military equipment, parts and components. It stated that sport and hunting weapons and antique rifles can be as lethal as military and law enforcement arms.

Venezuela declared that any modification on the language of the UN register should be done by technical experts.

United States stated that regulating the arms trade is an issue of national implementation and shall not fall within the purview of  an international organization. The ATT should be a framework for improving legitimate transfer decision-making. On scope, the US stated that the following should not be included:
- munitions and ammunition,
- explosives,
- parts and components,
- technology,
- technical assistance,
- R&D,
- technology transfer,
- financing.

France stated that an ATT embodies two pillars that distinct but linked 1) Regulation of legal trade, 2) Combating illicit activities. It said that anything that is not explicitly covered in the scope of the ATT is outside it. It claimed that there were omissions in Annex A, such as aircraft and definition of missiles.

Algeria shares the position of the Arab group but recalled the importance of UN Charter principles. Scope and parameters are linked. The scope of the treaty will inform the parameters and vice versa.

Denmark noted that the scope of the treaty should be considered in relation to the scope of weapons as defined in UNSC embargo decisions. At a minimum, those weapons addressed by UN embargoes should be covered by an ATT. Denmark is against including transportation in the definition of transfer as it is difficult to implement within a licensing system. In addition, a definition of arms brokering should not include transportation (problem of licensing).

Colombia mentioned the usefulness of an international mechanism for the regulation of the arms trade. It is in favour of including transport in the scope of the treaty. It was opposed to the inclusion of an exception provision.

Israel stated that the ATT should not cover financing. As to the possible amendments of Annexes, it believed it may involve the same procedure as amending the treaty itself.

Ghana declared that victim assistance provisions should not be treated under international cooperation and assistance.

Germany noted that it is possible to find a procedural solution in relation to State reporting on ammunition. Parts and components are to be distinguished from dual-use goods, the former are used for military purposes and dual-use goods are used for civilian and military purposes.

Russia insisted on the need to agree first on the goals and principle of an ATT before embarking into discussions on the scope. Russia referred again to restricting the illicit arms trade as the primary purpose of an ATT.

ICRC said that the scope should be a function of its object and purpose: to reduce the human cost (IHL and human rights law). It noted that UNGA Resolution 64/48 does not limit itself to any type of arms, e.g. SALW should be included. It welcomed the word "include" on conventional weapons to be covered as not being exhaustive and proposed to redraft the phrase to make this clear.

Friday, February 25, 2011

Informal Draft Paper on Criteria/Parameters by the Chair of the Preparatory Committee for an ATT: Good basis for discussion or cheap hamburger?

Ambassador Moritan, the Chair of the Preparatory Committee, has circulated his informal draft papers, which are expected to serve as the basis for discussions at the Second PrepCom for an ATT, which opens on Monday 28 February. At first sight, there is much to commend the draft, which covers a broad range of activities and conventional weapons, and lays down valuable criteria for determining the legality of any proposed transfer of arms. Ultimately, however, one is left with the impression that this is really a cheap hamburger: it looks good in the photo, but when you taste it, there's actually no meat in it.

First and foremost, the paper on criteria/parameters has a critical flaw. It starts by requiring States to evaluate on a case-by-case basis the decision whether or not to authorise a transfer of arms. So far, so OK. But it then provides that: "States should, as appropriate, take into consideration [the] following criteria." This introductory phrase appears to deprive the criteria laid out in the remainder of the provision of all objective force.

First, the use of the word "should" (as opposed to "shall") already shows that this is not an absolute obligation being proposed.

Second, who determines whether or not it is appropriate? The State? Is this an absolute discretion?

Third, and most serious of all, even this light hortatory language is rendered almost meaningless by the phrase "take into consideration". This means that all of the following criteria, however unequivocally they are phrased, are only to be "taken into consideration". Even a Security Council Chapter VII decision that is binding on every UN member State? The provision as a whole only becomes meaningful if this second sentence is deleted.

The criteria proposed are generally helpful. Section A (International Obligations of a State) merely repeats, in rather weak drafting language, that a State must respect the UN Charter law and its treaty and customary international law obligations.

Section B (Potential consequences of the arms transfer on internal, regional and international peace) introduces another subjective element whereby the substantial risk of misuse preventing a transfer must be "in the view of the potential transferring State", thereby further weakening the text.

The relevant provision on IHL and IHRsL suggests that a potential violation must be both of international humanitarian law and of international human rights law, which will certainly not be the case outside of an armed conflict. The "and" should become "or".

Section C (Consideration of the illegal use of the transferred) includes, with respect to genocide or crimes against humanity, a substantial risk that they would "likely be used" whereas all other criteria refer only to a substantial risk that they would "be used".
  
Section C 3. The wording of "any other crimes of international" should be clarifiied to identify which crimes  are being referred to.
Section C 4. The phrase "Be used to perpetrate acts of terror" should be clarified to identify which entity can perpetrate acts of terror (states as well as non-state actors?) and based on which parameters.

Finally, the criteria dealing with diversion refers to "unauthorised end users" without defining whether this means any individual or entity other than the stated end user on the relevant certificate.

Tuesday, February 22, 2011

Second Preparatory Committee towards an Arms Trade Treaty starts Monday 28 February in New York

The events in the Middle East and North Africa over the past few weeks have demonstrated in tragic detail the importance of an arms trade treaty that effectively regulates arms transfers between States. Conventional weapons and ammunition as well as chemical weapons supplied by arms manufacturing States have seemingly been used to violate the right to life and the right to protest of unarmed demonstrators exercising their rights to freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, right to information, and to liberty and security.
(c)Jesper Waldersten

More to come on the international legal implications of arms trade from the ATT bloggers ...

Monday, February 7, 2011

EU-UNIDIR Regional Seminar for Countries in Central, Northern and Western Africa, 2-3 February 2011, Casablanca, Morocco

‘Supporting the Arms Trade Treaty Negotiations through Regional Discussions and Expertise Sharing’


Participating countries: Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, DR Congo, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Tunisia

Unofficial summary

Most of the countries of the region are importers of arms. Nevertheless, it was felt that the ATT was important for them for several reasons. First and foremost, African countries are among the most negatively impacted by the circulation of weapons, especially small arms and light weapons (SALW). Indeed, several participants stressed that the proliferation of weapons has fuelled armed conflicts and prevented the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. In addition, the ATT could set up valuable cooperation mechanisms in terms of arms regulation between exporters and importers, benefitting from the sharing of experiences. Finally, the dichotomy ‘exporting/importing’ countries was not reflecting adequately the reality of the arms trade. Indeed, even though most of the countries concerned by this seminar were importing rather than exporting arms, these weapons could still be transferred to other countries, or could transit through their territories en route to other destinations.

The seminar showed that most of the countries, if not all, were in favour of better regulation of the arms trade at international level, and specifically supported the adoption of an ATT. As for the treaty’s legal framework, emphasis was put on the importance of the principles of the UN Charter, notably the principle of territorial sovereignty. The arms trade should not be an excuse for intervening in the domestic affairs of a State, according to the view of several participants. Some participants also underlined the fact that States had the responsibility to ensure that their level of armaments corresponds to their actual needs and be proportionate to the necessity to ensure peace and stability.

Among the many issues to be addressed, participants referred specifically to terrorism, armed non-State actors, and arms brokers. The challenge of regulating new ways to trade arms, such as through the internet, was also raised. Furthermore, the advantage of the treaty would be to contribute the harmonisation of the different juridical regulatory frameworks at national level. In that perspective, many countries from Central Africa underlined that their regulatory framework was going to be the one set up by the Kinshasa Convention of 2010 on the Regulation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (see also UNREC website).

As for the scope of the treaty, most countries were in favour of including the 7+1+1 scenario (the regulation of the trade in ammunition was considered crucial). Discussions also took place regarding so-called ‘traditional’ manufacturing of weapons. Some African countries were concerned by such manufacturing and while some participating States considered it should be regulated by the ATT, others were of the opinion it was part of the national sovereignty of States.

Concerning the parameters to be included in the treaty, most countries were in favour of including a UN Security Council arms embargo clause, an international humanitarian law clause, as well as a human rights clause, even though some countries admitted this was controversial. A clause concerning the prohibition to supply arms to non-State actors was also considered necessary. Some countries underlined that such clauses were necessary because the treaty would not only be a political and legal instrument, but would also be of a moral and symbolic nature. Thus, a prohibition on the supply of arms in situations where it could facilitate gross human rights violations was considered to be of a great moral weight.

Finally, many states put an emphasis on the need for the treaty to elaborate effective monitoring mechanisms and cooperation clauses between countries to ensure the better regulation of the arms trade.

Friday, November 12, 2010

EU-UNIDIR Regional Seminar for Countries in South and Central Asia 10-12 November 2010, Kathmandu, Nepal

"Supporting the Arms Trade Treaty Negotiations through Regional Discussions and Expertise Sharing"

Regional Seminar for countries in South and Central Asia, 10-12 November 2010, Kathmandu, Nepal.

Organized by UNIDIR - European Union - UNRCPD - Government of Nepal

Participating countries: Afghanistan - Bangladesh - Bhutan - Cambodia - Kazakhstan - Kyrgyzstan - Laos -Malaysia - Maldives - Mongolia - Myanmar - Nepal - Pakistan - Sri Lanka - Tajikistan - Thailand - Turkmenistan - Vietnam - Uzbekistan  (UNIDIR website for the Seminar)

Unofficial summary

Many countries from South and Central Asia are recipients of arms rather than exporters. A particular concern is the illicit trafficking of arms to armed non-state actors, in particular those designated by States as ‘terrorists’. Most participants in the regional seminar stated that the scope of the future Arms Trade Treaty should be limited, focusing especially on small arms and light weapons (SALW) and ammunition since this is the principal subject of illicit trade to armed non-state actors. The argument against a broader scope was that it would discourage adherence to the ATT. The desire was expressed for broad participation, in particular of the exporting countries. The call was also made for a succinct and clear treaty with an annex listing weapons covered by the treaty. Such annex could be easily updated. There was no agreement among participants on how to regulate private arms manufacturers.

The risk of having weapons falling into the wrong hands (in particular terrorists) was often referred to during discussions. The need to ensure ‘peace and stability’ and especially to avoiding large quantities of weapons in any given region was cited as an important criteria in efforts to limit the arms trade. With regard to human rights criteria for assessing the legality of transfers, a fear was expressed by some participants that the criteria would be used for political reasons as the criteria might be quite subjective. It was asked whether an exporting state's assessment of the situation in an intended recipient state would be communicated to the recipient state.

With respect to implementation, there was a reluctance among many participants to establish an international monitoring body. A meeting of States Parties seemed to be a preferred mechanism to promote the treaty's effective implementation. A lot of importance was accorded to cooperation between states on the sharing of best practices as well as assistance to enable them to control illicit access to arms by non-state actors.

Tuesday, October 19, 2010

Boston Symposium: Official Summary Report (October 2010)

Official Summary Report of the international conference on the ATT held at the University of Massachusetts Boston on 28-30 September 2010.

For further insights on the discussions and ideas that were generated at the Boston Symposium you may consult the unofficial report from the ATT bloggers.

Thursday, September 30, 2010

Unofficial Summary of the Boston Symposium

The organizers of the Symposium provided the participants with background papers for the three breakout sessions (on the issues of scope, parameters, and implementation) and the informal working lunch (on the issue of transparency) that was held on 29 September. They also submitted discussion questions that have helped to frame the debate during the sessions.

Parameters Background Paper and Discussion Questions

Implementation Background Paper and Discussion Questions

Scope Background Paper and Discussion Questions

Transparency Background Paper and Discussion Questions

Sessions on Scope

  • Having examined the limited scope of the UN Register of Conventional Arms Categories is broader inclusion of the scope of an ATT necessary? The inclusion of SALW appears to have broad agreement, but would the illustrative definition from the UN Register background information provide the best basis for the Treaty?
There was very broad agreement among the participants on the fact that the UN Register has a limited scope and is thus incomplete. The 7 categories are a good basis to start with, but there is a need to have broader coverage such as the formula 7 +1 + 1, which could be revised and updated by annual meetings of States Parties.

It was recommended that a negative definition should be included, “It is included unless it is excluded”  with specific exception such as sport guns.

One participant raised the issue of including non-kinetic-energy weapons termed "non-lethal", such as tear gas or Tasers in the list, which led to discussion on the coverage of military weapons vs law enforcement weapons. Participants generally agreed on the need to include both types of weapons into an ATT, however definitions remain to be clarified.

Are the UN ODA guidelines sufficient in defining SALW? Participants agreed that it is wise to use it as a good starting point.

  • Does the term “ammunition” or “munitions” best serve the purposes of an ATT? Is the term "munitions" too wide both for scope and reporting purposes?
Participants were not able to explain the proper differenciate between the two categories. Generally it was understood that “munitions” is a broad definition and ammunition being a sub-category. “Munitions” could be used as an umbrella. The precise distinction was, though, unclear.

  • What are the complexities of parts and components in the context of a global supply chain? What balance should be struck between control and facilitating movement while maintaining control? Is design intent i.e. “specially designed for military use” the appropriate guide in this context?
There was general agreement on the need to include parts and components. Although one participant raised the fact that it would be a burdensome excercise to issue a licence for all parts related to one type of weapon.

  • Does the Treaty require definitions for each of the types of transfer?
There was broad agreement that the term “transfer” should be refined. One participant raised the issue to take into account the entire supply chain in all its aspects.

In the context of discussions during the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) and the PrepCom the following activities have been identified as potentially falling into scope:

Import, Export, Re-export, Temporary Re-export, Transshipment, Transit, Brokering, Artisanal Manufacture, Technology Transfer, Manufacture under Foreign License, Leases, Loans, Gifts, Technical Assistance, Promotion and, Research, Financing, Training.

One participant suggested including “financing” in the list, since financial institutions play an important part in the supply chain.

There was discussion on whether there might be any useful WTO rules in this context.

  •  Is Foreign Licensed Production is an essential component of scope?
Foreign licenced production can be considered as an essential component of scope, but there was uncertainty in the discussion as to how it should be dealt with in an ATT. Transfer of technology should be included as well, in the view of some participants, although it was suggested that it might be already captured by an obligation to report on technology for manufacturing. When a license is granted, does a transfer occur? To whom the reporting obligation would fall? E.g. if the State X helps  State Y to build a tank, the State X would report on the export of technology and State Y would report on the transfer of the product (export).

  • Do broad headings, accompanied by illustrative Annexes provide the most effective means by which a Treaty can be negotiated, implemented and kept up to date? Should the principle of “keep it simple provide” a compass for eventual drafting and negotiation?
Participants recommended keeping it simple. A negative list could be useful, and an amendment of the treaty could be a way to expand it.

Dual-use goods might be difficulty to include in an ATT for it could be difficult to investigate all items; it would be an burdensome task to develop a list.

The question was raised whether reservations should be allowed.

There was general agreement that an ATT should not be in contradiction with other international law instruments, e.g. the UN Charter.

Sessions on Parameters

There was a general recognition that an ATT does not seek to ban transfer but to regulate and avoid illegal/irresponsible transfer. There was general agreement on the need to include international humanitarian law and international human rights law criteria.

  • Are there any criteria that should definitely be included in an ATT?
The criteria should be objective and non discriminatory and it should not include a lengthy list. Certain participants objected to the inclusion of customary international law. It was also asserted by some that the treaty should not codify new norms.

Many participants raised the issue whether there are any WTO trade law-related criteria that could be included.

According to the relevant background paper:

"States have also expressed the need to consider other factors relating to the recipient country. Without proposing any particular formulation, these considerations include:
…
d. whether the recipient exercises adequate national control of arms and complies with commitments in the field of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament;
e. the risk of diversion for unintended or unauthorised uses such as those mentioned in the above criteria or users such as armed groups, non-governmental bodies acting outside the law, persons designated as 'terrorists' or criminals." (Background paper p. 3)

One participant considered the points d. and e.  as “new criteria” that had not been discussed previously.

One participant referred to Transparency International that uses a tool “the integrity pact” to safeguard the transactions.
A number of participants referred to the "subjective" approach of  human rights, although one pointed out the fact that the definitions under IHRL are very precise.

Any decisions based on IHRL/IHL should be done on a case-by-case basis in order to avoid a general prohibition. There were concerns about creating a de facto embargo on a specific country when using the parameters. Others raised the situation of how to apply the criteria when the law enforcement system of a country has a very bad human rights record, compared to an army that respects international standards.

How to define “serious violation” was one important issue raised.

A participant stressed the importance to create a baseline and then States would be free to decide on more stringent criteria.

The risk assessment was considered to be the central issue and the failure to undertake it could lead to an irresponsible transfer. What is important is a careful risk assessment; reference was made to “subjected to rigorous scrutiny” (footnote 19 of the background paper).

The threshold of risk appeared more as secondary issue. “Clear risk” is the term used in arms transfer instruments, while NGOs have preferred the term “substantial risk”, but at the end of the day it does not seem to make any major difference.
One participant underlined the difference between “shall not” or “taking into account”  (feel free to ignore) language/approach, which have different legal consequences. There was general agreement on the need to adopt a "shall not" approach.

Where to find the reliable information/sources for the risk assessment?

This refers to objective indicators based already on the existing guidelines, e.g. ICRC, practical guide that refers for example to media, diplomatic information, NGO, human rights, ICC. Some participants stated that this is already done on a daily basis at the national level, there is a great amount of State practice on criteria and threshold.

Sessions on Implementation

National level
There was general agreement on what a national system should contain. It should contain specific legislation (.e.g., national implementation unit, criminal and civil law provision, the enforcement of ATT provisions).

International level

Co-operation and assistance:
-    Facilitating implementation of the ATT for States that lacks capacity to implement it
-    It can be an incentive for adherence, promoting advantage for its membership


One of the delegates in the Symposium raised a question whether States are legally obliged to cooperate internationally.
From International Law point of view, there is a UN Charter obligation incumbent upon States to cooperate internationally "in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion". This provision is stipulated by Article 1(3) of the UN Charter and is further expanded in Chapter IX under Articles 55 and 56. It is then up to specific treaty regimes to further define and operationalize this general obligation. Within ATT discussions, this would imply that States are in a position to give a precise definition of what international cooperation would entail in relation to Arms Trade.


The reporting mechanism should be included in the instrument on import, export, licensing system, etc., with a standardized reporting format (that is simple and flexible). Some States flagged that some sensitive information might not be published (confidentiality or national security ground).

One of the main objectives is to share information and build confidence. This could be done in the form of a monitoring/consultation/verification mechanism (bilateral, regional, group of concerned countries, peer reviews). There was not a clear agreement on the exact nature of an international mechanism.

Control Arms Coalition Final Remarks to the Symposium  

A broad scope is needed in a treaty in relation to its objective and purpose. It should include not only military but also law enforcement type of weapons. The 7+1+1 approach should not be considered as a shorthand but rather as a basis to develop a broad scope.

On parameters, the Coalition warned against using a loose approach, i.e. "taking into account"  might be interpreted as "feel free to ignore".

On implementation: they supported the general agreement on the implementation at the national level for a strong export control regime. They stressed the need to set up implementation mechanisms also at the international level.

Thursday, September 23, 2010

Boston Symposium on the Arms Trade Treaty

An important international conference on the ATT is being held at the University of Massachusetts Boston on 28-30 September 2010. The ATT legal blog will be updating you on discussions and ideas that are generated. The proceedings are subject to Chatham House rules, so we will not be able to identify speakers or participants without their consent. Hopefully this anonymity will encourage some useful discussions.

Friday, July 23, 2010

Beyond the Shadow of a Doubt? Thoughts on the first PrepCom for an Arms Trade Treaty

First the good news. It looks as if there will indeed be an Arms Trade Treaty and that the treaty may even be adopted at the Diplomatic Conference foreseen for 2012. Neither of these two possibilities looked anywhere near as likely prior to this first PrepCom.

The greater unknown is what precisely the treaty will regulate and how far it will prevent illicit transfers or the diversion of conventional weapons as well as 'licit' transfers of weapons that are subsequently used for unlawful purposes. Certainly, if an ATT endorses the status quo it will not only prove a failure, it will take us backwards, for there is almost universal agreement that the current situation is fuelling a myriad of conflicts, abusive violence, and societal misery.

Let us hope that the positive words and warm fuzzy feeling that enveloped many at the closing session of the prepcom is ultimately converted into effective action. For it is always to be feared, in the words of the late Will Rogers, that diplomacy is "the art of saying 'nice doggie' while looking for a rock."

Thanks to everyone for following our blog on the prepcom; we hope it has been useful. We will update it periodically with new information in the period leading up to the second prepcom in late February 2011. Hasta luego.

Day 10 of the PrepCom


The Chair opened the final session of the first PrepCom for an Arms Trade Treaty by restating the clear need that the second PrepCom in February 2011 will have to discuss "specific matters". In the period leading up to February, he noted the importance of planned informal and academic meetings and consultations, such as the regional seminars planned by UNIDIR.

He reiterated his commitment to be "always aiming for transparency and all-inclusive participation". He then made an interesting pledge to present Chair's texts to the second prepcom on scope, criteria and parameters, in his words "to provoke a reaction"! Although such texts bind no State in any way, they may be influential in mapping out the type of treaty that is ultimately adopted and thus he faces a major challenge in ensuring that transparency is maintained as he develops his texts.

There then followed many statements by delegations, all praising the Chair for his work.

Belgium speaking on behalf of the EU, candidate countries, as well as Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova state the view that the document the Chair had presented on Day 9 as one that reflected the discussions "in a balanced way".

Pakistan again stated its view that transactions between two sovereign States should not be affected by the treaty.

Egypt agreed that small arms and light weapons as a category falls within the definition of conventional weapons but fell short of specifically endorsing their coverage by the ATT.

Iran said some of the suggestions made by delegations were “naive” and claimed that some of these sought to cover all situations “apart from natural disasters and global warming”.

Switerland restated the need for an effective ATT, and hoped that the major arms exporter would become party to it. It called for a national implementation framework that would be easy to implement for a State that did not yet have the appropriate infrastructure. It hoped thaat the treaty wwould contribute to the maintenance of regional peace, stability, and security. Taking into account the limited time available, it suggested that States should not be over-ambitious.

Japan noted the importance of international cooperation and assistance, suggesting that capacity-building was one of the most important elements in treaty, to help States that need such assistance to implement the treaty, in particular by establishing a national licensing system. It hoped there would be a timeframe laid down for national implementation by the treaty.

Mexico again stressed the importance of including SALW, referring to it as a "moral obligation" on States.

Pakistan took the floor again to stress the need for consensus in adopting the treaty and the obligation not to erode State sovereignty.

Egypt noted that the facilitator's work has been a brainstorming exercise and that not too much should be read into the reports.

Thursday, July 22, 2010

Day 9 of the PrepCom

The session opened with the three Friends of the Chair reporting back to the plenary on the results of their informal discussions (see summary papers below). There was minimal discussion following these summaries, which represented the range of views on the scope of the treaty (especially which weapons would be covered); its parameters (criteria for judging the legality of a transfer), and measure to implement the treaty.
Facilitator's Summary for Scope

Facilitator's Summary on Parameters

Facilitator's Summary on Implementation and Application

The Chair then presented his revised paper on preamble and treaty elements (see below) and opened the floor for discussion. The interventions largely repeated earlier positions, as most delegations appeared to have exhausted the limit of their instructions and were simply treading water. The Chair amounced that discussions would, though, continue on the final morning of the prepcom. 

Chairman's Draft Paper

Wednesday, July 21, 2010

Day 8 of the PrepCom

The plenary reconvened on Day 8 of the PrepCom.

Belgium speaking on behalf of the EU said that the ATT should include provisions on international cooperation and assistance, which would be crucial to ensure that all States Parties implement the treaty’s provisions. There should also be a competent licensing authority at the national level, which would be the responsibility of each State Party. International cooperation should cover, inter alia, 1) legislative assistance, 2) institutional capacity building, 3) the implementation of administrative measures, and 4) technical assistance in other appropriate expertise. For further details, see the fact sheet on the experience of the EU in international cooperation and assistance.

The United States called for the discussion on the ATT to be narrowed in order to find more agreement among the delegations. It sought a straightforward document that would focus on the obligation of States.

France proposed an article on international mutual legal assistance, “shall afford the parties with mutual legal assistance in investigation, prosecution and trial proceedings.”

Australia said that transparency and reporting: could contribute to peace and security. 1) Compliance by state at the international level and 2) compliance by actors within the national system. It cited the example of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, which included a procedure for a State Party to request compliance from another, and if necessary a fact-finding mission. There is also provision for dispute settlement between States Parties. Australia also stated its support for international cooperation and assistance.

Pakistan said that transparency “is a potentially problematic concept”. It said that certain information about inter-State transfers could be shared in total confidentiality, but subject to the issue of national security.

Belgium again on behalf of the EU said that transparency covered important principles that touched on several aspects of the ATT. National reports should be mandatory on an annual basis to the UN secretariat for entry on a UN database. There should be requirements for information exchange, which should include exchange of information on the assessment of an application for the transfer of weapons governed by the ATT. Transparency and reporting would underpin a consultation mechanism allowing for the monitoring of the implementation of the treaty at national level. The ATT should also establish a review mechanism after five years after entry into force.

Senegal made a strong and surprising statement against transparency, arguing that this might infringe national security.

Brazil stressed the importance of international cooperation and assistance in the areas of exchanging good practice and providing training, technical assistance, and mutual legal assistance.

New Zealand said that international cooperation and assistance would be fundamental in the implementation of the ATT, and that the treaty should insist on high benchmarks. There are existing requirements focusing on border security requirements to draw upon.

Mexico made a detailed and forward-looking statement (jointly with Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Jamaica, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay). Among other issues, it called for the treaty to prevent diversion of arms to the illicit market. It stated that the treaty should apply to all conventional weapons and should be able to cover future developments of weapons. The transactions covered by the treaty should be broad. It called for all weapons covered by the treaty to be marked at time of manufacture. No transfers of weapons to non-State actors should be permitted. It also discussed the risk of diversion from UN peacekeeping operations.

Nigeria said that technical assistance should be on request, but that victim assistance should not. It declared that those whose commercial interests and profits have caused sufferings to others should be held accountable. It recommended that a provision on victim assistance be included separate from the provision on assistance and cooperation.

The Chair suggested that victim assistance should be separated from international cooperation and assistance.

Belgium referred to its national legislation on child soldiers, noting that it had adopted a law by which it is illegal for it to export weapons to countries where children were recruited in the regular armed forces.

Costa Rica said that transparency was important and should include periodic and detailed reports covering the obligations arising from ATT on both authorized and unauthorised transfers. There should be provision for international assistance. It called for civil society to have access to information on international arms transfers. It stated that it could be counterproductive to refer to international humanitarian law and international human rights law in the treaty.

The USA mentioned the fact that delegates should consider the elements they want to be put forward, that time was precious and that delegations should be careful not to undermine the process, which could lead to a failure.

Pakistan said that the issue of UN Peacekeeping operations was an issue to be discussed in another forum. It stated that child soldier is a noble suggestion, but claimed that an agreed international definition of a child was lacking.

Tuesday, July 20, 2010

Day 7 of the PrepCom


Suggested treaty text on victim 
assistance and national implementation measures

In the absence of entry to the closed session of the PrepCom we have continued to offer draft text for the future ATT, with a proposal for provisions on victim assistance and national implementation measures, including penal sanctions. Numerous States have spoken in favour of a victim assistance provision in the treaty, such as Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, the Philippines, and Uruguay. Only Egypt has publicly questioned the inclusion of such a provision. A short commentary on our suggested provisions is included on the page to the right.

Article X. Assistance to the victims of armed violence

Each State Party undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance and cooperation, to the maximum of its available resources, to ensure the provision of assistance to the victims of armed violence in areas under its jurisdiction or control. Such assistance, which is to be rendered in accordance with applicable international law and standards, including the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, shall seek to promote their effective rehabilitation and recovery as well as their social and economic reintegration.

Article XX. International cooperation and assistance in favour of the victims of armed violence

Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation and social and economic reintegration of victims of armed violence. Such assistance may be provided inter alia through the United Nations system, relevant international, regional or national organisations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and their International Federation, non-governmental organisations, or on a bilateral basis.

--------------------

Penal sanctions and other measures to ensure the effective implementation of the Convention will be critical in ensuring that its core obligations do not remain statements of good intention. Below is proposed an article on legislative and other associated measures in a future ATT.

Article XXX. National implementation measures, including penal sanctions 

1. Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures to implement this Convention, including the imposition of penal sanctions to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

2. Each State Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, a serious violation of this Convention as defined in paragraph 3, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another State Party concerned, provided such State Party has made out a prima facie case.

3. Serious violations to which this article applies are any unauthorised transfer of any conventional weapon within the scope of this Convention and which result in the death or serious injury of one or more civilians.